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Abstract
We propose a software toolkit, intended to automate the differential cryptanal-
ysis of cryptographic constructions based on the operations addition, rotation
and xor (ARX). The toolkit consists of several programs, each of which evaluates
the probability that xor or additive differences propagate through a certain type
of operation. Types of operations that are supported are xor, modular addition
and multiplication by a constant.
A subset of the problems to which the proposed toolkit can be applied, have
been studied in literature before. In [1], matrix multiplications are used to cal-
culate the differential probability xdp+ of addition modulo 2n, when differences
are expressed using xor, and the differential probability adp⊕ of xor when dif-
ferences are expressed using addition modulo 2n. The time complexity of these
computations is linear in the word size n.
In our toolkit, we use the same concept of matrix multiplications. The gen-
erated matrices are correct by construction, and their size is automatically min-
imized. The main advantage of our technique, is that it is more general, and
can therefore easily be extended to a larger number of cases. The proposed tools
can be used to compute xdp+ and adp⊕, as well as xdp+(α, β, . . . → γ) – the
calculation of xdp+ for more than two inputs, and the differential probability
xdp×C of multiplication by a constant C where differences are expressed by xor.
The tool is also capable of efficiently counting the number of output dif-
ferences for each of the mentioned operations. An instance where this problem
occurs, is in the cryptanalysis of Threefish-512 [2], where an exponential-in-n
time algorithm is proposed. Using the toolkit, this can be solved in linear time
in n.
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The tool also provides a general algorithm to efficiently list the output differ-
ences with the highest probability, for a given type of difference and operation.
The cases handled by the toolkit, are encountered in many ARX-based cryp-
tographic algorithms. Examples are the XTEA block cipher [3], the Salsa20
stream cipher family [4], and the hash functions MD5 and SHA-1. Other exam-
ples are 6 out of the 14 second-round candidates of NIST’s SHA-3 hash function
competition [5]: BLAKE [6], Blue Midnight Wish [7], CubeHash [8], Shabal [9],
SIMD [10] and Skein [11]. Our tools can assist in the cryptanalysis of each of
these algorithms.
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